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The Secularism of Music Studies
Jim Sykes
Why does power need glory? If it is essentially force and capacity for
action and government, why does it assume the rigid, cumbersome, and
“glorious” form of ceremonies, acclamations, and protocols? What is the
relation between economy and Glory?
—Giorgio Agamben1

Political Theology and Formations of
Music History
In his book The Kingdom and the Glory,
Giorgio Agamben reconsiders Carl Schmitt’s
famous thesis that “all significant concepts
of the modern theory of the state are
secularized theological concepts.”2 Schmitt,
a committed Nazi, sought (as Carl Raschke
puts it) “to revalidate somehow the premodern assumption that political absolutism
had its own kind of legitimacy, if it had
the warrant of religious transcendence.”3
Agamben argues that there is in fact a second
paradigm of sovereignty also operative in
early Christian political theology, the “divine
economy” or oikonomia (“an immanent
ordering—domestic and not political in
a strict sense—of both divine and human
life”).4 To stick with Raschke’s summary of
Agamben a bit longer, he suggests that the
origins of the second paradigm lie “in Jesus’
proclamation of the ‘kingdom of God’”:
On the one hand, “kingdom”
(basileia)
signifies
unconditioned
divine sovereignty, but as the Great
Commandment implies, and Jesus’
own radically relational interpretation
of what it means to be a participant in
the “kingdom,” it also connotes limitless
mutual obligations that we have to each
other, a form of a familialism reaching
infinitely beyond the limits of blood,
kinship, and any particular, concrete
“household.” It was under the influence of

Christianity and the writings of Saint Paul
that the classical notion of dike morphed
into the broader, “cosmopolitan” ideal of
what nowadays we term social justice.5

Trinitarian doctrine sought to resolve
how God could be complete, infinite, and
pure while existing on earth in limited
and material form.6 Here is Hippolytus’s
description of this (as summarized by
Watkin):
The Father is one, but he is two persons,
Father and Son, and then there is
a third, the Holy Spirit. The third
mediates between Father and Son, first
in that the Father gives orders which
are performed by the logos revealed in
the Son. Then the Son, through belief,
is accorded to the Father as the one
who performs the Father’s will. In other
words economy, the Holy Spirit, is a
doubly mediating articulation that does
not actually reconcile Trinitarian and
Gnostic theology but solves the ageold theological problem of how God’s
will is actuated on the earth without
undermining all the elements of God’s
power, such as omniscience, atemporality,
the will of good resulting in the existence
of evil etc.7

The heavenly army of bureaucrats—that is,
the angels and clergy—act to dispensate,
manage, and produce the glorification of God,
making humans aware of his providence,
leading ultimately to their redemption
in the kingdom of heaven. The central
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observation of Agamben’s book is that
“the apparatus of the Trinitarian oikonomia
may constitute a privileged laboratory
for the observation of the working and
articulation . . . of the governmental
machine” because it shows modern
sovereign power in its “paradigmatic form.”8
What Agamben finds in each era is an
“empty throne” whose power is dispersed,
managed, and legitimized through glory to
produce consensus. He likens the economy
of salvation to the modern media’s ability
to produce and retract glory in secular
democracies (“the acclamative and
doxological aspect of power that seemed to
have disappeared in modernity”).9
In a stunning argument that should
give music scholars pause, Agamben
locates music at the very center of the
early Christian oikonomia. This is because
music is central to the production of glory
that is bestowed upon the sovereign by
liturgy, ceremonies, and acclamations,
the purpose of which is to “cover with
its splendour the unaccountable figure
of divine inoperativity.”10 Glory fills the
“unthinkable emptiness” left in the wake
of divine inoperativity (i.e., the empty
throne), but in so doing, it is also what
“nourishes and feeds power (or, rather,
what the machine of power transforms
into nourishment).” 11 Thus, Agamben
asks, “what is a politics that would not be
of government but of liturgy, not of action
but of hymn, not of power but of glory?”12
The empty throne of the sovereign who
is glorified through the divine economy
that acts on his behalf to redeem humans
is fully revealed as inoperative after
redemption, when what will remain is “a
hymnological hierarchy”: the angels, “left
without act or praxis as God’s will has been
completed so that he is, yet again, pure
120

Being without any further act, represent
through their songs of praise, God’s
inoperativity (he no longer needs to act on
earth).”13 Note the causal power of music
in this production of sovereignty—music
acts to provide “cover” for the sovereign’s
inoperativity—yet note also that Agamben
does not perceive music as doing anything
to humans, society, or God here, since
music-as-glory is revealed in the end
merely to represent divine inoperativity.
(Notice the dichotomies in Agamben’s
phrase “not of action but of hymn, not of
power but of glory.”) Paradoxically, music
in this conception lies at the center of the
oikonomia but is noneconomic, without
action and without power.
“Inoperativity as the dimension most
proper to God and man” reaches its
apotheosis in the Jewish Sabbath and
Christian Sunday, when all work ceases.14
To my ears, the celebration of rest—which
in churches and synagogues has long
featured uses of song to glorify God—is
the origin of Western society’s notions of
music as transcendence, epiphenomenon,
and an alternative to normative labor.
Musicological scholarship has often located
these concepts in the emergence of the
Western classical canon in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, but the value of
Agamben’s text is not just that he shows
how going back to early Christian political
theology allows us to grasp their Christian
origins. Rather, it is that he demonstrates
the signal importance of music-as-glory,
music-as-non-normative labor, and musicas-noneconomy to Christian tradition,
concepts that (I strive to show in this essay)
become firmly integrated into the modern
Western ontology of music in secular form
but have been much less discussed by
music scholars than the historicization of
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transcendence and the musical works that
(I contend) derive from them.15
At this juncture, I want to question
whether Agamben is not taking a modern
view of music and projecting it onto early
Christian political theology—for surely the
role of music in early Christian theology is
more complex than he makes it out to be.
Music’s role throughout diverse Christian
theologies today is emotive, redemptive,
salvific: music transforms the interior
state of a person. For the early church
fathers, though, music’s value lay in large
part in the sense of unity that monophonic
choral singing facilitated, conceived as a
mimicking of the angelic choirs.16 Music
was granted as a concession to human
weakness, since God does not need singing—
perhaps music, then, was “nourishment”
more for people than for divine sovereign
power.17 The value of music-as-glory lay, I
suggest, not so much in its legitimization of
God’s power but in the spiritual discipline
it facilitated for worshippers: music in
this conception moves to the sovereign as
glory, but it also points from the angels to
the individual who pours open their soul
within the social unit of the choir, offering
“one’s whole spirit as incense.”18
I suggest music was a critical part of
the early Christian economy of salvation
(and not just a representation of divine
inoperativity) in at least one other sense. In
virtue of music’s role as a smokescreen for
divine inoperativity that is conceived as a
representation of angels’ hymnody (labor
conceptualized as nonlabor), it actively
shapes the oikonomia itself: this is because
music works toward redemption by doing
away with divisions between humans
(ethnic, national, cultural, gendered, etc.)
in a way that presumes Christianity’s
universality but is hierarchical since it places

those who are not Christian on the outside.
Consider the political theologist Shane
Akerman’s statement that
the sacred liturgy is . . . not only a
public act of the Church, but also one
that sets itself in opposition to the
narrowly nationalistic public space of
the state. As one moves up the vertical
axis, participating more profoundly in
the worship of the angels, then one’s
horizontal reach is also widened. All of
creation is called inward and upward in
the participation of the worship of the
triune God.19

The German theologian Erik Peterson
describes this ontology of musical
salvation in terms that would horrify any
ethnomusicologist: “every type of ethnic
singing, folk music, and national anthem
eventually succumbs to its inevitable
decline.”20 The result is that “it is worship
that predates governmentality and worship
that will outlast it.”21 God is eternal
while cultural practices and governance,
giving rise to difference and violence, are
transitory and ultimately superseded:
“the government is nothing but the brief
interval running between the two eternal
and glorious figures of the Kingdom.”22
This veneer of music-as-inclusive-inaction
diverts attention from its active exclusion
of those who think otherwise.23
We might ask why Agamben takes the
early Christian presentation of liturgy
as laborless and powerless at face value,
viewing only what music does inwardly (it
is a smokescreen for divine inoperativity)
rather than outwardly (it excludes through
its ideology of inclusion). The reason, I
contend, is that our modern ontology of
music carries forward these notions of
music-as-glory, music-as-non-normative
labor, and music-as-representation from
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early Christian political theology. This
makes it difficult for thinkers who have
grown up in that tradition to analyze
music outside of its concepts (this is why
many keen musical listeners and thinkers
can read the phrase “not of action but of
hymn” without batting an eye). It becomes
difficult to see what music is doing to Others
through a framework that assumes music
doesn’t do anything to Others. Or, to put
this another way, the ontology positions
music as having a community-forming
capacity through the idea that music, which
does not really do anything but bestow
glory and serve as an antidote to normative
labor, can be a way for a community to
understand itself.24 Music’s ability to divide
one community from another, its ability to
connect to Others outside a community,
its ability to be a form of mundane and
everyday labor, its way of relating directly
to nonhuman animals and God(s), its
efficacious powers to plea with and cajole
the divine—these and similar concepts
(widespread outside Abrahamic religions)
are expressly avoided in the Christian
paradigm that (as Agamben demonstrates,
albeit accidentally) undergirds many
modern assumptions about what music is
and how to think about it.
Secular Resonance
In this essay, I provide a framework for
registering the enduring presence, if not
dominance, of concepts from early Christian
political theology—music-as-glory, musicas-noneconomy, music-as-non-normative
labor, music-as-representation, and musicas-salvation—in the secular methodologies
of music studies.25 I propose (1) that
Agamben’s analysis demonstrates the
widespread tendency for Western scholars
to recursively use concepts from the early
122

Christian ontology of music, personhood,
and devotion in secular form to analyze
those concepts’ development in Western
history (as well as musics that developed
outside Christian influence). I call this
tendency “secular resonance” and contend
it has shaped music studies—indeed, much
of music history around the globe—in its
(in His?) image. The notion that music’s
primary function, given its presumed
“inaction,” is to form community and
bestow glory upon it or individuals,
especially through festivity (as a presumed
break from normative labor) and through
music’s ability to serve as a representation
of a community’s beliefs, has a Christian
(perhaps more specifically, a Protestant)
heritage.26 To be clear, my aim here is not
to call out scholars who inadvertently use
this Christian-derived ontology when it is
inappropriate to do so, but rather to gain
a basic understanding of how it came to
shape (and continues to shape) formations
of music globally and in music scholarship
(including ethnomusicology) through the
process I call secular resonance. (2) I argue
that secular resonance, in taking music’s
representational capacities at face value—in
presuming the legitimacy of music-as-nonnormative labor that builds community
through its capacity for a shared experience
of salvation—has long obscured music’s
function as an economy in the structuring,
hierarchical, familial, and political sense
(oikonomia), including between humans
and nonhumans, and between humans
belonging to different communities.27 (3)
I contend that in secular modernity, musicas-glory became redirected away from
God, but the early Christian theological
conceptualization of music—expanded
via Protestant-influenced secularism to
include a community’s supposed emerging
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in “private reason”28 via a “scene” defined
by symbols that represent and mediate
musicians’ and listeners’ actions—remains
marshaled (such as through the culture
concept) as an inclusive methodology that
excludes through its transformation of
difference.29
In celestial mechanics, “secular resonance”
describes a type of orbital resonance
in which the rotation (or “precession”)
of a celestial body gradually becomes
synchronized with a larger body, typically a
planet, over a duration of a million years or
more.30 This use of “secular,” pertaining to
“characteristics that change slowly over time,”
derives from an old definition of secular as “a
long duration” that was once widespread in
scientific fields from economics to geology.
It is from the late Latin saecularis (“worldly,
pertaining to a generation or age”),31 which,
as Charles Taylor and many others have
shown, developed into “secularism” through
the medieval European notion of secular as
“worldly” activities not considered sacred.32
I use the term “secular resonance” here
in the first sense above: it is a process
of slowly bringing the sounds of Others
into the orbit of the Christian ontology of
music, even when the latter has been firmly
secularized, through an influence that is
barely if at all noticeable. Music-as-glory
and music-as-salvation, I suggest, double
themselves in terminology like “music and
nationalism” and “music and ethnicity,”
slowly transforming musical difference
into Christianity’s likeness.33 Marilyn
Strathern calls this “the duplicate”: when
we demarcate the concept “knowledge,” for
example, it produces knowledge; through
such doubling, concepts come to occupy
“both an object position and subject position
in relation to itself ” and thus “subject and
object cocreate one another.”34 In music

studies, “the question as to what constitutes
knowledge is going to be intimately bound
up with the question as to what constitutes
relations.”35 This is not just because we
investigate the relations between people and
their music, nor because we must consider
ourselves as researchers in relation to the
people and musics we study. If we frame our
methods only in these ways, we are already
performing secular resonance since we will
leave out relations between (say) people
and their neighbors, God(s), nonhuman
animals, plants, ritual objects, and the like—
all of whom/which have been shown to
be relevant (if not generative) for musical
actions the world over—while assuming
that music functions as a representation
and expression of the interior state of the
peoples who made it. What needs to be a
focal point of scholarship is how those who
think otherwise have engaged this Western
conception of music-as-nonrelation (music
defines who is on the inside of a boundary, not
how those within a boundary relate to those
outside), music-as-noneconomy (music is
an expression of an interior state, not an
action that produces personhood through
exterior relations with Others), and musicas-nonlabor (music is a way to blow off
steam, as entertainment and/or devotion).
This can be achieved only by avoiding our
own imposition of the Christianized secular
ontology of music in our documentation
of the otherwise. By “secular resonance,”
then, I mean the process through which our
musicological vocabulary doubles itself to
eliminate the types of relations from music
history that contradict Christian political
theology’s ontology of music and its myriad
doublings (through the ages) that have come
to shape music studies. The legacy of secular
resonance, I suggest, has been: (1) a decline
of music’s social power (“not of action but of
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hymn, not of power but of glory”); (2) the
sedimentation of a notion of musical labor
as non-normative that affects musicians’
livelihoods (sometimes positively, though
more often, I suggest, negatively); and
(3) an enormous transformation in global
conceptions of “musicianhood” that mimic
early Christianity’s eradication of pagan
ontologies of music.36 To be clear, I am not
making the endlessly repeated suggestion
that scholars need to better place music in
its social context. Rather, I am making the
claim that when we do so, we tend to utilize
conceptions of music and personhood
derived from an early Christian political
absolutism that ignores the potential for
the second paradigm of Christian theology
to reach outside itself and wind down our
secularized, Christian-derived exclusionism,
the result of which would accord more
closely with what Raschke calls (above)
“social justice.”
Ancient Christian Musics: 		
“Drastic or Gnostic?”
I turn now to addressing the yawning gap
between those who study European musics
from the medieval era to the present and
those who study musics of the ancient
world (mainly classicists). For what lies
between is the historical transition to
Christian hegemony articulated by the
church fathers. Nowhere has the Christian
theological paradigm of music been
more pronounced in silencing musical
difference—nowhere has our secular
resonance been more prolonged and
powerful—than in the near-total erasure
of “pagan” (ancient Greek and Roman)
musics from Anglo-American music
studies. In writings by musicologists
coming from the “American school,”37
ancient Greek and Roman musics have
124

often been “cleaned up,” celebrated for
their mathematics, morals, and cosmology
(in a secular manner), removing them from
their well-documented (by classicists)
attachment to sacrifices, processions, and
religious cults. Alternatively, ancient Greek
and Roman musics are studied on their
own terms, mainly by classicists, typically
at a distance from early Christian music
or the longue durée history of Western
music.38 Surprisingly underresearched are
the efforts of the church fathers to ban
pagan musics and instruments from the
church.39 This foundational exclusionism
of Western music history, indeed the
whole era of transition from ancient musics
to Christian dominance, is routinely
skipped over or barely mentioned in
music textbooks, and it is virtually absent
as a scholarly specialization in AngloAmerican music departments.40 It is as
though those of us who work in AngloAmerican music studies believe that very
little of interest happened for four or
five centuries (or more) after the birth
of Christ (I must admit, I long assumed
so myself ). 41 In my experience, a reason
often given for this temporal gap is a “lack
of sources,” so it bears emphasizing that
there are thousands of texts in Latin and
Greek (and myriad other languages, like
Aramaic) that survive from the period.
Such sources are detailed enough about
daily life, for example, that they have led
classicists to study the sounds and smells
of ancient cities.42 The musicological
gap here strikes me as akin to scholars of
(say) thirteenth-century Europe or Asia
skipping over the Mongols because they
can’t sympathize with their worldview;
the problem, I suggest, is that we have
trouble taking the pagans’ side in the
story of the emergence of Christian
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musics. Musicologists who come to this
early material often do so because they are
Christian and intend to study the growth
of that musical tradition (a Strathernian
doubling). The blame can be spread
around to include ethnomusicologists’
commitment to ethnography and their
general lack of interest in this subject
matter, as well as the methodological
tendency for music scholars studying
ancient music history to research Christian
musics qua Christian musics rather than
their communal encounters with Others.
The point I want to drive home here is
that when the fundamental violence of the
break with pagan ontologies of music is
not acknowledged, the Christian musical
ontology appears as something that
early Christians simply assented to—I
will describe this below as a Protestant
ontology of music projected back in
time—rather than a world-historical
transformation in what music is that was
brought about through the disciplining
efforts of the church fathers and early
Christian music itself.
I do not have space to consider the
church fathers’ disciplining of music here in
much depth. I point readers to two sources:
Johannes Quasten’s Music and Worship in
Pagan and Christian Antiquity and James
McKinnon’s The Temple, the Church Fathers
and Early Western Chant.43 Both are obscure
and, in my experience, not discussed
much (if ever) in Anglo-American music
departments. Both are old: Quasten’s book
is based on his 1927 dissertation submitted
to the Catholic Theology faculty at the
University of Münster, with the English
translation (now out of print) appearing
just in 1983; McKinnon’s book, published
in 1998, is based on his 1965 dissertation.44
Quasten’s book begins with several chapters

on music in Greek and Roman sacrificial
rituals and cults—here are the opening lines
of his chapter 1:
The legends and myths of nearly all
pagan peoples have sought to explain the
elaborate use of music in their worship
by indicating that the art of music was a
gift of the gods to men. . . . According to
the view which was most widely held,
it was to the gods themselves that music
was pleasing. This is how Tibullus, for
example, interprets the connection
between music and worship. In keeping
with this is the explanation Horace gives
for sacred music when he calls it a means
of appeasement which, like the fragrance of
incense and the blood of animals, disposes
the gods to act favorably toward men.45

Even according to the Christian theologian
Quasten, then, the foundations of Western
music history lie not in the theorization of
scales, or Platonic or Aristotelian notions
of music and morality, or the harmony of
the spheres, or chant or polyphony, but in
music’s use as a gift to the gods: music in
the earliest moments of Western history is
fundamentally relational, conceived not as
an expression of an interior self or identity,
but as a means to cajole, plead with, and
appease divine sovereign power. If a retort
to this claim is that such an ontology is
a “prehistory” to Western music, that it
disappeared in the wake of Christianity,
bears little resemblance to Western music
history today, and thus does not constitute
what defines Western music history, we
must note that you are then defining
Western music history as founded upon and
equivalent to the growth of Christianity.
But this line of thought makes two rather
extreme assumptions: first, that the shift to
Christianity was willingly assented to by the
bulk of the population, and thus was a choice
that is reflective of a broader civilizational
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identity; and second, that dissenting voices
and ontologies did not persist and do not
also define Western music history over the
longue durée.
Now consider how Clement of
Alexandria (d. ca. 215 c.e.), in his Paidagogos,
felt “called to take up the struggle against
the ‘music of idols’”:
When a man occupies his time with
flutes, stringed instruments, choirs,
dancing, Egyptian krotala and other
such improper frivolities, he will find
that indecency and rudeness are the
consequences. Such a man creates a din
with cymbals and tambourines; he rages
about with instruments of an insane cult.
. . . Leave the syrinx to shepherds and
the flute to superstitious devotees who
rush to serve their idols. We completely
forbid the use of these instruments at our
temperate banquet.46

Arnobius (d. 330), in his Adversus nationes,
“advises the pagans” thus:
You are convinced that the gods are
pleased and influenced by the sound of
brass and the blowing of flutes, by horse
races and games in the theaters and
that, as a result, the wrath which they
have conceived at one time or another
is quelled by such satisfaction. To us
[Christians] this seems out of place. In
fact it is incredible that those who far
transcend every kind of virtue should
find pleasure and delight in things that
a reasonable man laughs at and which
no one appears to enjoy except little
children or those who have been poorly
and superficially brought up.47

The polemic goes on and on like this for
a couple hundred years—the ancient
sources read not much differently from
today’s Muslim reformists’ banning of
instruments (with whom there are indeed
shared roots in ancient Greek philosophies
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stating that music leads to licentiousness).
According to McKinnon, early Christians
blamed poor behavior on instruments and
their condemnation should not be taken to
mean they were not performed in the early
church. By the third and fourth centuries,
however, due to mass conversions to
Christianity, instruments became more
directly associated with pagan rites and
strictly forbidden on those grounds:
“Where aulos-players are, there Christ is
not,” John Chrysostom (d. 407) states.48
The Christian liturgy was advertised as a
“sacrifice ‘worthy of God,’ in sharp contrast
to pagan sacrifice.”49 McKinnon notes that
“the attitude of opposition to instruments
was virtually monolithic even though it was
shared by men of diverse temperaments
and different regional backgrounds, and
even though it extended over a span of at
least two centuries of changing fortunes for
the Church.”50
Despite such strict proclamations by
the church fathers, Quasten claims, early
Christian worshippers resisted giving up
aspects of pagan musical worship:
The more Christianity expanded among
the pagans, the more difficult it became to
hold fast to “adoration in spirit,” as Christ
had asked for. No longer did it suffice
merely to offer the people a substitute
for pagan sacrifice and cultic music . . .
in the singing of psalms and hymns.
Now apologists had to work against the
people’s attraction for customs that they
had grown to love.51

The struggle was made more difficult
because “even the Jews, God’s chosen
people, had made great use of this art [i.e.,
instrumental music] in their liturgy.”52
Ephraem of Nisbis (d. 373) expressed
anxiety that worshippers might relapse
into pagan musics:
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Today, to all appearances, they sing
psalms as God has ordained, and
tomorrow they will eagerly dance as
taught by Satan. . . . Let it be far from
you that today you listen attentively to
the reading of the divine Scripture as one
loving Christ, and that tomorrow you
listen to lyreplaying as a criminal and a
hater of Christ.53

Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 390) “had to
impress continually upon his flock the fact
that the playing of the tambourine had been
replaced in Christian liturgy by hymnody,
while the psalms took the place of other
songs.”54 In the fourth century there was
a move against allowing women to sing
in Christian worship, which Quasten
suggests was due to their prominence in
Gnostic rituals.55
Why present the outlines of this violence
against pagan musics here? I am struck by
how, through the many years I have spent
in music departments in the United States
(and two in the United Kingdom), not
once have I heard anyone ask about the
mass ontological transformation in music
forced by early Christianity, nor question
the impact this had on the language we
use to study music today. Meanwhile, the
language that emerged through Christian
theology (much of it stemming from
Judaism)—representation,
expression,
salvation, noneconomy, and so on—is often
taken as the default assumption about what
music is, while Western music history—
analyzed through those very concepts—is
defined precisely as a story about how
those concepts won out. Regardless of
one’s valuation of this history, it still seems
to me that a scholarly discussion on this
history of suppression should be had, from
outside of the musicological terms that
were born by Christianity itself. Yet the only

two academic books I found on the social
history of music in this era were published
long ago and are now out of print. In sum,
I am not saying no one currently researches
this (I do, after all, spend a lot of time with
ethnomusicologists), but in my experience,
few music scholars specialize in this era, and
it seems that few of us feel we need to care
about it.56
My aim here is not to vilify Christianity
nor any particular scholar, but rather to point
this out as an example of secular resonance—
in this case how nominally objective, secular
scholarship may carry with it a Christian
bias in how it defines Western music history,
who the protagonists of that history are, and
what its operative terminology and ontology
consist of. I should also stress it is not my
aim to argue that music needs to be revived
as an accompaniment to the sacrificing of
bulls. Rather, I am suggesting that by failing
to recognize the depth of these struggles
over the ontology of music within Western
music history—which would amount
to admitting that many in the Western
past resisted what is now the “orthodox”
ontology of music in the West—“Western
music history” becomes a story about how
Christianity worked inclusively in the West,
in opposition to perceived external Others
(e.g., Muslims as the boundary with the
West), rather than an acknowledgment
that Christianity worked hard to exclude
internally (i.e., non-Christians in Europe;
and those deeply Othered by the Christian
ontology of music, such as drummers).57
As a drummer from the West, I know
all too well that the “Otherness” the church
placed on percussion continues to define
drummers in the West today (consider the
early drummer joke from Paul the Apostle:
“If I speak with the tongues of mortals and
of angels, but do not have love, I am a noisy
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gong or a clanging cymbal”; Corinthians
13:1). The hegemony of the voice over
drumming surely extends to music
scholarship—I consider this a key secular
resonance—as though the voice is more
fundamental to what it means to be human,
a
Judeo-Christian–derived
tendency
reinforced by the fact that music scholars
these days often grow up in an atmosphere
that privileges the voice over drumming
(another secular resonance). The fear of
drumming’s evident relationality outside
the bounds of community has always
appeared to threaten disorder (such as in
the colonies, whether in the United States,
where drumming was banned for slaves on
plantations, or in South Asia, where the
British regulated processional drumming
through permits) and of course has long
been racialized, with characterizations
of Africans as talented at rhythm and
drumming in opposition to European
music defined as melodic and vocal.58
The hegemony of sheet music as the
premier source for historical musicology
in that field’s opening decades, particularly
with regard to the study of early Western
music, was another key secular resonance
that is necessary to mention here. The
problem was not just with the formalistic
approach it allowed but that the use of
sheet music (a form of representation)
to generate scholarly representations of
music history is a form of “doubling” (in
the Strathernian sense above) that uses
a particular object (sheet music) and the
discourse about music it generated to study
the growth of music itself as a historical
phenomenon. I am not suggesting that
formalism has a genealogical relationship to
Christian ontology, but rather that it lent a
veneer of secular objectivity to a method that
was bound to position Christian musical
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ontology and subjectivity as normative for
the foundation of Western music. The point
was registered by Rousseau long ago in his
On the Origin of Language (1781), which
Jacques Derrida (in his Of Grammatology)
sums up thus: “The history of music is
parallel to the history of language, its
evil is in essence graphic.”59 Rousseau’s
complaint was that sheet music facilitated
greater distance from the tetrachord
system of ancient Greek music, which he
romanticized as closer to speech; leaving
this romanticization aside, I can rephrase
this to say that early sheet music and its
doubling in secular music scholarship was
a key mode through which pagan musical
ontologies became marked by absence and
taken to constitute a non-normative aspect
of the “identity” of Western music history.
Carolyn Abbate’s famous article “Music—
Drastic or Gnostic?” urges musicologists to
turn to performance (for which, following
the philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch, she
uses “drastic” as a shorthand) as opposed
to a focus on gleaning the meaning of a
musical work through hermeneutic analysis
(which, following Jankélévitch, she
calls “Gnostic”).60 On the one hand, I am
echoing Abbate here by suggesting music
scholars need to better recognize how early
Christian music played this disciplining,
transformative role (for surely that was
“drastic”), thus lessening our reliance on
treating sheet music as a “neutral” source
that provides a window onto early Christian
musical meaning (“Gnostic”). On the other
hand, I named this section after Abbate’s
article to point out that any online search
for the term “Gnostics and music” brings
up her article rather than any study of what
the actual Gnostics—those stigmatized
insiders/outsiders to Christianity—did
with music. Perhaps it is time for music
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studies to be both drastic and Gnostic, by
which I mean we need to consider the
dissenting ontologies of music in the
West during the period of ascendence for
orthodox Christianity (and beyond).
Colonialism, Culture, and 		
Political Liberalism
Talal Asad’s writings on secularism have
been vastly influential in the academy
but underrecognized in music studies.
Thus it bears mentioning that his famous
demarcation is between “the secular
as an ontological-epistemic formation,
secularism as a political doctrine about the
separation between religion and politics,
[and] secularization as simultaneously a
historical process and a sociological thesis.”61
As Sabah Mahmood puts it, the secular
“is not simply the organizing structure
for what are regularly taken to be a priori
elements of social organization—public,
private, political, religious—but a discursive
operation of power that generates these very
spheres, establishes their boundaries, and
suffuses them with content, such that they
come to acquire a natural quality for those
living within its terms.”62 Thus far, I have
been proposing a framework for thinking
about “the secular” in music studies as “a
domain of historically constituted and
variably related behaviors, sensibilities”
related to (and reproducing) early Christian
notions of music, experience, personhood,
community, and discipline through
nominally secular methodologies like the
study of early sheet music.63
Asad’s Genealogies of Religion explains
that the idea that religion has an autonomous
essence allows us to view it as a transhistorical
and transcultural phenomenon.64 In
modernity, he claims, this resulted in the
assumption that Protestant Christian

understandings of religion—as based on
“inner states rather than outward practice,”65
defined as “a matter of symbolic meanings
linked to ideas of general order,”66 and as a
set of beliefs one assents to—are universally
applicable to all religions. Such a perspective,
Asad argues, has a Protestant Christian
history and ignores the role of institutional
power and discipline, which needs always
be situated in its unique social and temporal
context. In light of Asad’s critique, I would
like to return to my earlier point about the
persistence of a Christian ontology of music
and ask whether formations of the secular
in music studies utilize Protestant Christian
understandings of music (even when
studying the distant Christian musical past),
and if so, how these might differ from the
early Christian theology of music described
via Agamben. But before turning to this, I
want to consider secularism as a political
phenomenon, because I believe doing so is
necessary to grasp the ways the Christian
theology of music in its Protestant guise
spread globally, including its shaping of
ethnomusicology.
Sociologist José Casanova argues that
capitalism and racial exclusions laid the
foundations for secularism: alongside 1517
(Martin Luther’s reforms), he believes an
important date was 1492, both as a signifier
of the general period in which Jews and
Muslims were expelled from Spain “to
create a religiously homogenous realm”
and “the beginning of European global
colonial expansion initiated by the Iberian
monarchies.”67 It was in the wake of all this,
Casanova writes, that the management of
new confessions in Europe allowed states
to increasingly centralize their power. As
Kenneth Dean and Peter Van der Veer note,
for Casanova, the Reformation and CounterReformation are best described
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as creating the conditions for nationalism through state-controlled religious
confessionalization processes involving
ethnic or religious communal “cleansing.” Where adherence to a national (or
a territorially divided and nationally
supervised) church was a prerequisite
to full belonging.68

Through this process, they write,
“religious imaginings of majoritarian
belonging [became] crucial to the
formation of the multiple forms of
secularity and secularism.” 69 Religious
innovations usually happen in cities; after
all, “pagan” originally meant “country
bumpkin,” since the earliest Christians
were in cities. 70 Urbanization does not
necessarily lead to a drop in religion when
those from rural areas move to the city and
become cosmopolitan.71 In many cases the
result is rather the development of overt
ethnonationalisms in which urbanized
elites use religion in the public sphere
to rewrite a nation’s music history. We
can see this, for example, in India today,
where the trend to “Hinduize” Hindustani
music elides the influences of Others
(particularly Muslims and the lower
castes). Even in a comparatively tolerant
country like Singapore, the notion of
equality between races (liberalism: each
must act equally in accordance with the
law) has pressured communities into
“rationalized” expressions of religion
due to the need to maintain orderliness
in public space, resulting in pressure to
eradicate practices like trance.72
In this way, the relationship between
music and secularism becomes a mode of
communal identity formation that produces
notions of essential difference between
ethnic and religious groups. Traditional
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music, now metonymic for community
and mobilized as a “transhistorical and
transcultural phenomenon,” serves as
“proof ” of communal differences and a
community’s willingness to conform to
liberal demands for equality. This Protestant
secularism in “traditional music” resembles
a Lacanian process of identifying “lack” in
the Other—those having to rationalize
their religious musics to conform see a lack
of concern for the “real” (i.e., efficacious,
trance-inducing) traditions from the state,
while those on the side of the state see a lack
of modernity in the former—and each side
looks to the law (including state-driven
discourses on cultural authenticity rooted
in state funding and nationalist displays
of culture) to safeguard its rights in virtue
of having authentic practices. This drives
an “archive fever” to find and prove the
authenticity and ancientness of practices.73
This intimate attachment between
music and identity—the transference of
music-as-glory and salvation to nonChristian settings around the globe—
should be understood as emerging from
the imposition in the colonies of the
trifecta of political liberalism, secularism,
and the culture concept. As numerous
scholars of South Asia have shown, in
British colonies like India, public space
became masculinized and assigned as the
rightful place of the market, while private
space became feminized and considered
the domain for formations of culture and
religion.74 This echoes Charles Taylor’s
claim that the Protestant revolution, in
conjunction with the growth of science
and capitalism, appears to have promoted
a detachment of religion from public life
that made religion appear more about
community and communal values.75 In
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turn, music could easily be taken as
representative of a community’s culture
rather than being efficacious, public, and
relational; religious processions, in this
view, are not gifts to gods that plead with
and cajole them into action but the public
emergence of a community and its alreadyformed culture expressing its identity in
public. Mahmood puts it this way:
. . . the inescapable quality of secularism
in part emanates from the structure
of the modern liberal state, which
promises to demolish premodern
forms of hierarchy in order to create a
polity where all citizens are supposed
to be formally equal in the eyes of the
law. This promise, we might recall,
was linked to a foundational critique of
ascriptive inequality and a recalibration
of particularistic forms of belonging.
The modern political subject had to
subordinate fealty to his religion, locale,
and clan to loyalty to the nation-state.
A key dimension of this transformation
was the legal and political elaboration
of the public-private divide, which was
an important source for elaborating
other modern distinctions such as
secular/religious, political/civil, and
universal/parochial.76

In promising to “demolish premodern
forms of hierarchy” to produce equality
under the law, liberalism emerges as
secularism’s version of Agamben’s second
paradigm of early Christian political
theology, since the mandate to accept
equality requires leaving one’s differences
behind to be included in a social context
that claims neutrality but is, in fact,
transformative and exclusionary.
The result has not been the total
rationalization and disenchantment of
music. In many former colonies, the
anticolonial elites of an earlier generation

gave way to those invested in efficacious
ritual practices and religious revivals that
have merged with ethnonationalists’ uses
of music-as-identity to drive contemporary
politics. Certain secularized musics partake
in the “magical elements of state sovereignty,”
helping produce the “sacrilized nation” in
secular form.77 What has resulted, however,
is a collapsing of cultural practices into a
relationship with ethnicity that obscures
their histories of connection between
Others. This, I contend, is the global legacy
of the Christian ontology of music-asglory, music-as-representation, and musicas-salvation.78
In looking at “music and secularism,”
then, I suggest we need to avoid collapsing
it into a study of how sacred music
traditions become disenchanted or hidden
in private spaces; rather, we should look at
how the work of secularism, in public spaces,
institutes “Protestant secular” beliefs
about the human, God, causality, space
through the law, capitalist development,
and “tradition”—the result being that
cultural practices become “ethnicized” and
conceptually lacking in “relations” with
Others. It is precisely this formation of
the secular that we “double,” I suggest,
when we write about “music and ethnicity,”
“music and nationalism,” and the like. My
point is not that we should refrain from
studying such topics; rather, I suggest that
when we presume the naturalness of musicas-salvation and music-as-noneconomy
and mobilize it to conceive of what music
is in relation to identity formation, we
are producing a secular resonance that
investigates a formation of the secular from
within the vocabulary the secular has made
available to music studies—a language that
is heavily Christianized in secular form.
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Capitalism and “Protestant Secular”
Music Studies
Rather than celebrating divine sovereignty,
music today glorifies the individual (as
composer, musician, band, listener, or
community in isolation), while sovereignty
is equated with a lack of institutional or
divine control (small government) and
work ethic (as Weber famously showed).
Akin to Asad’s critique of Protestant
secularism (above), music is now a matter
of lifestyle, rife with symbols that stand for
what the person or community “assents”
to, which mediate actions (e.g., long hair,
rock, free love). Also “Protestant” is that
the privileging of music as a personal
choice turns listeners into consumers and
obscures the disciplining role of music on
the body by institutions (record labels, high
schools, venues) and inscriptions (e.g.,
films). Music still glorifies inoperativity
since it is viewed as a temporary release
from labor (time off work, when one
“blows off steam”); even when economic
success is achieved through music, it
remains conceptualized as an alternative
to real labor (not a “normal job”). Thus,
as with early Christianity, music-as-glory
continues to serve as a smokescreen for
its own labor. But now this operates via
commodity fetishism, since the social labor
that influenced the compositional process
(yielding the musical “product”) is obscured
in favor of the genius-star-sovereign whose
glory is bestowed by fans and managed by
bureaucratic figures (the new oikonomia)—
first the conductor, sheet music publisher,
concert booker, and musicologist; then the
record company, record producer, music
video director, and so on; and in our times,
the solitary electronic musician at her
laptop who is at once a musician, composer,
manager, and promoter (the apotheosis of
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neoliberalism). In the neoliberal era, each
musician is her own oikonomia, dispensing
and managing her own glory, with the
necessity of a vigorous work ethic marketed
by institutions (e.g., websites charging you
for distribution) as a musician’s personal
choice to be independent from institutions
(e.g., record labels). Music as freedom from
normative work undergirds our notion
of music as the celebration of human
achievement and culture, severing music’s
relationship to our natural environment
except as aesthetic inspiration (where
music serves to represent nature or present
a composer’s feelings toward nature)
and eliminating the notion that we labor
through music for others rather than just
as an expression of ourselves.
Meanwhile, in music studies, this
Protestant secular musical ontology allows
for the seeming translatability and mutual
comprehension of differing conceptions
of sound, personhood, community, and
territory, “binding” and “tying” bodies
and sounds together so that they appear
in sync like planets in orbit, consumable
in the classroom today amid a musical
marketplace dominated by phenomena
like “the playlist” (secular resonance).79
As with Asad’s discussion of “religion,”
the positing of “music” as a universal
category likewise positions it as having an
autonomous essence—allowing us to view
music as a transhistorical and transcultural
phenomenon—when we look for it in
particular contexts. Conceived as a neutral
framework, a search for “music” tends to
utilize the Protestant secular understanding
of it as lifestyle when discussing an
individual or musical product in the
capitalist marketplace, while the communal,
ethnicized framework (described in the
prior section) is used for “traditional” and
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“classical” musics around the world but
excludes the Western classical canon.
Between these poles of the individual
and community, curiously, lies the Western
classical canon as formulated by some
long-canonized musicologists, of whom
I’ll name Carl Dahlhaus as a preeminent
example. The idea of relation emerged for
such scholars as internally valid through
highlighting (some might say fetishizing)
the listener-music-transcendence relation
—a Christian extrapolation if there ever was
one (as some of them admit). Once again,
music-as-glory presents itself as welcoming
and inclusive but excludes any perspective
that might claim external relations. This
ideological opposition to the social—
the idea that recognizing the social is a
bastardization of the music which, though
nominally secular, is treated as an object
that must not be profaned—was perhaps
most infamously expressed by Charles
Rosen in the hostility he showed toward
Tia DeNora for her sociological study of
Beethoven’s genius.80 Viewed as potentially
debased by the market and linked to ethnic
identity only by reference to the Volk who
could be referenced within the abstracted
work, the pretense to secularism (in
scholarship on the canon and the canon
itself ) greatly loosened as scholars (of that
era) became enthralled with how Western
classical music produces Christianity from
within the supposedly secular space of
its performance—what has been termed
“secular enchantment.” Consider Dahlhaus’s
statement
that
“even
Beethoven’s
symphonies [became] ‘religious’ music,
since they represent an evolutionary stage
at which the ‘ever-drifting World Spirit’ has
transmuted clearly the defined Christian
beliefs into previsions of the ‘marvels of a
distant realm.’”81

It is a sign of how far we have come that
Abigail Fine (in this special issue of the
Yale Journal of Music and Religion) locates
the roots of Dahlhaus’s (and the canon’s)
secular enchantment rather than simply
using it as her mode of analysis:
The politics of canon formation mirror
secularity because canons emerged at
the intersection of sacred and secular,
through a constellation of practices
known as Kunstreligion, or art-religion.
In the nineteenth century, cultural
heroes like Bach, Beethoven, and Mozart
became surrogate saints for the liberal
elite, for whom Bildung was grounded
in an amalgam of religious practices:
Catholic sainthood, Lutheran Pietism,
and Jewish educational ambition, all
latent behind the smokescreen of secular
self-improvement.

No longer a smokescreen for divine
inoperativity, music became “the smokescreen of secular self-improvement,” taking
on many of religion’s material components.
The term Kunstreligion (art-religion),
Fine says,
refers to a set of concepts at the
intersection of German Romantic
philosophical idealism, Catholic revival,
and a growing interest in Eastern
religions in the early nineteenth century.
Its roots in musical thought have been
traced to early Romantic writers like
Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder and
Friedrich Schleiermacher, who sacralized
the listening experience as a form of
devotion and likened religious feelings
to a “holy music” (heilige Musik) that
should accompany secular life.

Fine shows that some Jewish intellectuals
hid their roots and conformed, while
others rebelled against the “Christian
secularism” of the canon by adopting
Marxism—“a satisfying surrogate for
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national consciousness” since it appreciated
“the collectivity of human achievement by
Jews and non-Jews alike.” The struggles of
Jewish composers and critics to assimilate to
the secular canon’s Christian underpinnings,
Fine argues, demonstrates that Bildung failed
to offer the secular space it promised. The
same process of exclusion through inclusion
identified above in the erasure of the pagans
and Gnostics from music history, and
through the imposition of secularism and
liberalism in the colonies (and of course also
missionization), thus happened similarly in
Europe at the heart of the classical music
canon through the assimilation or exclusion
it mandated of Jews. The message of the
Western ontology of music seems always to
be: you can join us, but only if you listen
(and think) as we do.
The Special Issue
The six essays in this special issue mark a
turning point in music studies’ engagement
with secularism because they refuse the
types of facile secular resonance described
above. More important, they demonstrate
how musicians are combating the exclusions
of Christianized secularism as it dominates
various public spheres, particularly in
tandem with neoliberal capitalism. 82
Braxton Shelley’s essay considers Rev. Dr.
William Barber’s role in the “fusion politics”
of the North Carolina-based Moral Mondays
movement, through which he aimed to
produce “higher ground” following the
enactment of Tea Party–influenced policies
by the state’s Republican legislature, which
gained control of both branches of state
government in 2010 and the governorship
in 2012. Speaking at largescale protests,
including the 2014 Historic Thousands
on Jones Street March, when 85,000
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people gathered, Barber problematized
the boundaries between the sacred and
secular through his use of “Blackpentecostal
breath”83—“jeremiads” that are situated
“at the intersection of political speech and
ecstatic sermon.” In Barber’s performances,
sounds that are highly characteristic of black
sacred rhetoric are recruited to “critique
the oppression wrought by contemporary
social orders.” What I am interested in here
is how Barber’s refusal of secularism is a
refusal of the secular resonance between the
ethics of neoliberal capitalism and white,
conservative, evangelicalism that positions
itself as embattled but actually dominates
the “neutral” public sphere:
By claiming that various features of a
governing program are immoral, Barber
seeks to deny the system the legitimacy
on which it depends, suggesting that this
interruption is the most effective affront
to the extant structure. As he names
protest in these moral terms, Barber
aims to invalidate the injustices that are
naturalized by market capitalism, the
persistent inequity that is explained away
as evidence of personal irresponsibility,
asserting that there is also a public
responsibility. If neoliberalism is a
political theology, then it is differently
vulnerable to theological critique.

Reverend Barber produces an inclusive
universalism akin to the second paradigm of
early Christian political theology outlined at
the start of this essay—a radical relationality
necessary for social justice.
In Andrew Mall’s essay, liberal, white
Christians come together to combat the
toxic mix of neoliberal and conservative
evangelical hegemony. The Beer & Hymns
movement—which fosters community
through the singing of Christian hymns
in bars and festival settings—allows for
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those who left the church to engage in
their nostalgia for hymnody and childhood,
while calling on others who simply enjoy
hymns to gain a sense of togetherness in
the wake of neoliberal isolation. The event
brings Christian singing into public space,
but it also somewhat divests Christianity
from hymnody by situating it in a secular
setting. Here the theology of music-assalvation remains but has been transferred
to “Protestant secular” notions of the
self and community. Though less overtly
political than Barber’s jeremiads, the Beer
& Hymns movement also challenges the
secular resonance between neoliberalism
and evangelicalism by aiming to be “as
welcoming as possible, and in doing so to
recognize that faith identities are multivalent
and problematic, and that no matter your
religious beliefs, baggage, or lack thereof,
singing hymns can be fun.” Here Christian
music becomes a welcoming “secular” public
expression of the longing for relationality
that, ironically, refuses the Christian
absolutism dominating the “secular” public
sphere in the United States.
Shobana Shankar’s essay explores how
Hindus in Ghana have responded sonically
to Christianity’s dominance in Ghana’s
public sphere. Though Ghana is a secular
state and safeguards the right for people
to join different religions, Pentecostal
Christians have had a large influence on
defining religiosity in the public sphere, and
according to Shankar they tend to look down
on Ghanaian Hindus as idol worshippers.
Hinduism is positioned by its Ghanaian
practitioners as a return to “tradition” that
liberates some senses Christianity has kept
down, though Ghanaian Hindus have
reshaped certain mantras in the wake of
Christian influence, adopting some musical
practices not found in India. This is the third

example in this special issue of how secular
public space is dominated by a hostile
and conservative evangelical Christianity,
leading to particular compromises and
refusals by those who think otherwise.
In Oksana Nesterenko’s essay, these
dynamics are reversed: in the former Soviet
Union, the government and public sphere
were defined by atheism and so Catholicism
came to signify a radical otherness that
signified the possibility for freedom,
relationality, and community. In the 1970s,
composers like Alfred Schnittke, Sofia
Gubaidulina, and Arvo Pärt turned toward
Christianity, a move that happened, as one
pianist of the era quipped, because “the
flavor of life forced everyone to go to church.”
Nesterenko highlights the emergence of
a theme that has productively dominated
discussions of secularism in music studies,
“secular enchantment,” and, through the
music of Vyacheslav Artyomov, an attempt
to revive religion in public spaces in the
wake of state atheism.84
What appears at stake in these essays
is oppression rather than religion per se:
whatever exclusions come to dominate
the public sphere call forth sonic protests
for inclusion and respect for difference.
Religious musics become vessels, or
perhaps I should say efficacious offerings,
that have the potential to produce social
justice through relationality outside the
bounds of community.
Conclusion: From “The Other” to 		
“The Otherwise”
While I have been critical of secular
resonance throughout this article, adopting
the normative, Christianized, secular
musicological language is not always
misplaced, and in fact is often impossible
to move beyond for good reason. This
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is because secular resonance in many
places has become something like what
Mauss called a “total social fact” and thus
created the conditions many of us study.
For example, if we are able to trace a line
from certain anticolonial and postcolonial
constructions of music as national culture
in newly independent states to colonized
intellectuals whose notions of culture
have a clear genealogical relationship to
the Herderian paradigm of folk music
as communal and national expression
(Herder was a Lutheran pastor), it follows
that scholarship on those postcolonial
traditions may need to utilize concepts that
emerged from and reproduce the inherited
Christian musical ontology in secular
form that they are being used to analyze.
But this does have the effect of making
our Christianized, secular musicological
concepts—which today have an astounding
global ubiquity—appear to be what music
is in nature, a tendency that is of course
another secular resonance.
Secular resonance becomes more
noticeable and important to flag as a tendency
to avoid when one is doing research with
communities that have not been shaped by
it. Thus it is not so easy to ask, has music
studies moved beyond secular resonance or
does secular music studies remain a “fugitive
way for [Christian] religion to survive”?85
What is more appropriate, to my mind, is to
ask, have we learned how to move beyond
secular resonance for those contexts when
our inherited Christian musical ontology
is inappropriate? I believe we have indeed
made significant improvements, though
a discussion is outside the bounds of this
article. Suffice it to say here that despite
the rather polemical tone of this article,
I acknowledge that music scholars of
all stripes have been chipping away for
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decades to make available the perspective
on secular resonance that I present here
(which is not to say they would agree with
all my assumptions and formulations).
Some noteworthy examples, to name a few
stretched out over the past few decades,
include Philip Bohlman’s historicization of
Herder’s identity paradigm; Georgina Born’s
mobilization of Alfred Gell’s anthropology
of art in a music studies framework, which
treats art objects as having agency on the
viewer; Tamara Levitz’s convening of the
“Musicology Beyond Borders?” colloquy
in a special issue of JAMS that she edited;
and Ana Maria Ochoa Gautier’s work on
ontological difference in colonial Colombia.
Each of these works helps us move beyond
secular resonance, even if they do not use
that term.86
I should also be careful to avoid my own
secular resonance by unwittingly attributing
to the Christian secular ontology a global
dominance that it does not have. Many
countries in the world are not secular, and
in many societies where secularism is state
policy, many sounds and musics remain
largely untouched by secularization. There
are also places where Christianity is not
dominant in state-driven secularism (for
example, the imposition of the Islamic
conceptualization of God on Balinese
Hindus by the constitutionally secular
Indonesian state).87 Lauren Osborne shows
in her essay in this issue that Christianized
secularism is not a force that positions
qur’anic recitation in Oman. Her study
highlights the bureaucratic, governmental,
and economic (i.e., cultural differences
in how sound plays a role in any given
ordering, “domestic and not political in a
strict sense—of both divine and human
life”).88 Rather than the transformation
of religion, Osborne shows that, on the
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one hand, technologies like the internet
are tools through which the Omani state
promotes traditional ways of reciting and
memorizing the Qur’an. On the other hand,
the modern state is “secular” (the official
place of Islam in Oman notwithstanding).
Religion here again adopts the mantle of
“culture” and is presumed to be an important
component of Omani identity, history, and
heritage. Religion and secularism are thus
not naturally opposed. Rather, the secular
state and new technologies in Oman become
means through which religion is at once
newly situated and traditionally reinforced
through governmentality.
These are important points for scholars
of music to keep in mind as we increasingly
turn to sound studies: for, as Jonathan
Sterne famously showed, the West’s “audiovisual litany” is of Christian heritage.89 This
ordering of the senses “idealizes hearing
(and, by extension, speech) as manifesting
a kind of pure interiority. It alternately
denigrates and elevates vision: as a fallen
sense, vision takes us out of the world. But
it also bathes us in the clear light of reason.”90
This is a “metaphysics of presence” that,
Robin James notes, “we get from Plato
and Christianity: sound and speech offer
the fullness and immediacy that vision and
words deny.”91 But when scholars turn to
sound but retain the idea that it produces
immediacy and is necessarily opposed to
vision, she notes, they actually double
down on what the discourse on sound is
intended to supplant: the hegemony of
Christian framings of the senses—which is
to say, they produce secular resonance. As
Elizabeth Povinelli puts it, in terms that
echo my description of secular resonance,
“What is initially dispersed noise comes to
enclose itself through self-reference (and
thus an initial this-that differentiation),

creating its differential qualities and
skin, and, in the process, pulling in
and altering that which surrounds it.”92
Following Povinelli, I suggest we might
strive to move beyond “the Other” per
se in music studies—beyond thinking
that what is needed for equity in music
studies is simply a greater representation
of difference according to the terms of our
Christianized secular ontology—and move
toward a better respect for what Povinelli
calls “the Otherwise.” This would amount
to being more careful about inadvertently
forcing the Otherwise through the sieve
of the audio-visual litany, but it will also
require avoiding what Povinelli calls “the
cunning of recognition”—the tendency
for liberal multiculturalism to require
minority groups (such as in courts of
law) to act traditionally.93 In other words,
moving beyond secular resonance is not
a process of naming authentic traditions
that are seemingly beyond the grasp of
modernity, for doing so has long been the
task of ethnonationalist movements that,
paradoxically, appropriate such traditions
through the colonial-derived framework
described above (and thus their own
secular resonance).
In sum, just as ecomusicology
reinforces a boundary between nature
and culture when writers demarcate a
seemingly enclosed concept of “nature”
there for study (as Ana Maria Ochoa
Gautier has argued),94 positing religion
in music studies as “a distinctive space of
human practice and belief which cannot be
reduced to any other” is a formation of the
secular.95 In saying this I mean no ill will
toward this journal; rather, my aim is to
issue a warning for scholars of music who
think the topic of secularism is irrelevant
for their research if they do not study
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religious musics. To sequester the study of
secularism and music in journals of “music
and religion” would be another secular
resonance. Furthermore, when we position
Christian musics (vis-à-vis the public and
private spheres) as the ground level for
our investigation of music and secularism—
as I suggest we tend to do—we position
what is actually a globally specific case for
thinking about music and secularism as the
norm. Christianity is unique for the study
of “music and secularism” because the
religion’s notions of salvation, glory, and
representation already define the normative
secular ontology of music, so what emerges
from such studies is an emphasis on the
public/private placement of religion rather
than the misrepresentation and elimination
of ontological difference that occur when
the normative secular ontology is applied
to non-Christians. This hiding of the
transformative power of Christian-derived
concepts of music studies that occurs
through their doubling—even when “music
and secularism” is the topic of study—is of
course another secular resonance, a binding
and tying effect that, over a long period
(saeculum), transforms difference.

A more interesting question than
Agamben’s that leads off this essay—why
does power need glory?—is to my mind its
opposite: why does glory need power? The
secularization of music and music studies
removes music from the formal/societal
institutions that gave it power in order to
position music-as-representation as the
will of a sovereign individual (musician,
composer, listener) removed from social
obligations. In some cases, such as when
music-as-culture works to eliminate caste
discrimination in India, this can be a good
thing.96 But too often around the world, I
suggest, musical labor loses its value as part
of an ordering economy or oikonomia and
becomes valued merely as the production
of a self seemingly removed from relations
to Others. Power comes from relationships;
the British queen is nothing without her
subjects. Once conceptually removed
from the production of political and
social power—viewed as being situated
in relation to politics and in an economy
rather than always already being a political
economy—music is reshaped into what it
is not in nature: merely representative and
not causal.
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